Risk Management Handbook: FAA-H-8083-2 Change 1
Chapter 6 Single-Pilot Resource Management
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Chapter 6 Single-Pilot Resource Management Introduction While crew resource management (CRM) focuses on pilots operating in crew environments, many of the concepts apply to single pilot operations.
Many CRM principles have been successfully applied to single-pilot aircraft and led to the development of single-pilot resource management (SRM).
SRM is defined as the art of managing all the resources (both onboard the aircraft and from outside sources) available to a pilot prior to and during flight to ensure a successful flight.
SRM includes the concepts of aeronautical decision-making (ADM), risk management, controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) awareness, and situational awareness.
SRM training helps the pilot maintain situational awareness by managing automation, associated aircraft control, and navigation tasks.
This enables the pilot to accurately assess hazards, manage resulting risk potential, and make good decisions.SRM helps pilots learn to execute methods of gathering information, analyzing it, and making decisions.
Although the flight is coordinated by a single person and not an onboard flightcrew, the use of available resources, such as air traffic control (ATC) and automated flight service stations (AFSS), replicates the principles of CRM.
Recognition of Hazards As will be seen in the following accident, it is often difficult for the pilot involved to recognize a hazard and understand the risk.
How a pilot interprets hazards is an important component of risk assessment.
Failure to recognize a hazard becomes a fatal mistake in the following accident involving an experimental airplane.
During a cross-country night flight, an experimental airplane experienced an inflight fire followed by a loss of control.
The aircraft hit a building and both the commercial pilot and the private pilot-rated passenger were killed.
There were no injuries to anyone on the ground.
Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time.
The flight departed from its home airport about 20:00.
The experimental four-place, four-door, high-wing airplane had a composite fuselage powered by a Lycoming IO-360 engine.
The aircraft had logged 94.1 hours.
At the time, the flight was transitioning through Class B airspace and receiving visual flight rules (VFR) advisories from Approach Control.
According to the facility transcript, at 20:33:36 the pilot queried the controller about a fire smell and asked if there were fire activity in the marshland below them.
The controller indicated in the negative, to which the pilot responded, “We just want know if it’s the airplane that smells or the air.” [Figure 6-1] Shortly afterward, the pilot was advised of a frequency change, which was acknowledged.
At 20:36:06, the pilot checked in with another controller and was given the current altimeter setting.
A little more than 1½ minutes later, the controller transmitted that he was not receiving the airplane’s Mode C transponder altitude, to which there was no response from the pilot.
All communications with the aircraft were lost.
Radar data indicated that when the pilot queried the controller about a fire, the airplane was at 5,500 feet mean sea level (MSL) heading north.
The airplane’s radar track continued northbound until 20:37:13, at which time the last transponder return from the airplane was recorded.
The remainder of the radar track (primary targets only) showed the airplane turning right to a heading of east-southeast.
At about 20:39:20, the airplane turned further right to a heading of south.
The last
