Zia knew from the very beginning that he was imposing martial law in a country which had bitter memories of two earlier martial law regimes, and that even if a section of the people was prepared to accept a new martial law in order to eliminate a common enemy, he would soon be required to furnish proof of legitimacy. He decided to meet the situation through the simple method of countering the popular perception of reality with illusions of his own creation.

The experiment began while searching for a justification for the July 5, 1977 takeover. The whole country knew on the night of July 4, 1977, that, after indulging in muddle-headedness for months, the leaders of the PPP and PNA had found a way out of the crisis which could have served as a pretext for disruption of constitutional life. The country had been pulled back from the precipice, and the danger of civil strife had been averted. Yet General Zia insisted that he had intervened to save the country from bloodshed and chaos.

Further, unlike Ayub Khan and Yahya, who justified martial law in its own right, General Zia relished the idea of a Chief Martial Law Administrator decrying martial law. In this way, he almost succeeded in convincing all the politicians that his sole mission was to hold a re-run of the March 1977 elections. When it was discovered that fresh elections might not achieve the liquidation of the ousted political party, and some of the PNA parties gave vent to their apprehensions, postponement of elections was presented not as something desired in partisan interest, but as a requisite of national survival.

The question of legitimacy, however, continued to pose problems. In the popular perception, only a rule in accordance with the constitution was legitimate. A two-pronged theory was advanced to ease the situation. First, it was assiduously maintained, contrary to all evidence, that the constitution of 1973 had not been thrown overboard, but only held in abeyance. Second, the definition of legitimacy was changed. It was argued that martial law might be contrary to the legal and constitutional norms held dear by the people, but it could legitimise itself if it strove to achieve a noble objective, such as accountability or Islamisation of the polity.

Another illusion considered necessary to legitimise martial law concerned supremacy of the normal law and independence of the judiciary. The state of emergency and the Defence of Pakistan Rules were withdrawn and the people given the tidings that they would be subject only to martial law regulations! The superior courts' verdicts would be respected and it was immaterial if the composition of courts was changed during the pendency of crucial petitions or appeals. The Provisional Constitution Order, which divested the superior courts of inherent powers to check the executive's excesses, was presented as a means of guaranteeing the supremacy of law. The independence of the judiciary was not affected by simply getting rid of judges by not inviting them to take a new oath.

The illusion found most effective in resisting the return to constitutional order was the programme of Islamisation. General Zia originally found two glaring deficiencies in the 1973 constitution: that it was necessary to strike a balance between the powers allowed to the president and the prime minister, and that the Islamic provisions of the basic law needed to be strengthened.

A beginning in this direction (the Hudood Ordinances, introduction of the zakat and ushr schemes and the creation of shariat benches in the superior courts) could not be made till about two months before Mr Bhutto's execution. Some other essential amendments were only introduced in March 1985. Throughout this period, it was given out that Islamisation of laws had never been attempted before, although there were people around who could recall the Shariat Act of 1937, a similar law of 1948, the adoption of Islam as the state religion in 1973, and such measures as the creation of the Islamic Advisory Council, enforcement of prohibition, etc.

In the fields of foreign policy and economic management, the same pattern of countering reality with the help of illusions was followed. Pakistan was not involved in the conflict in Afghanistan; on the contrary, the Afghan mujahideen were fighting to defend Pakistan's integrity. Since national security was at stake, anybody disagreeing with the policy on Afghanistan became unpatriotic and an opponent of the Islamic revival. If the country's economy was becoming overly dependent on foreign loans, it was a proof of our credit-worthiness.

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