George C. Marshall, the Army’s Chief of Staff during 1939-45 and Secretary of State and Defense during 1947-49 and 1950-51, respectively, is best known as the Allies’ “organizer of victory” during World War II and steward of the namesake economic recovery program that helped stave off communist-incited instability in postwar Western Europe. Far less well-known is Marshall’s extensive engagement with the world of intelligence during those years. In his Army leadership role in World War II, his diplomatic mission to China right after the war, and his service as head of the State and Defense Departments, he grappled with difficult issues concerning intelligence capabilities and authorities, security matters, and political and bureaucratic conflicts that persist today in the US Intelligence Community. How he approached them can provide insights for current intelligence leaders and practitioners as they confront those historically enduring problems.
David Robarge is Chief Historian of the Central Intelligence Agency. He joined the CIA in 1989 and worked as a political and leadership analyst on the Middle East. After earning a Ph.D. in American history from Columbia, he moved to the History Staff in 1996 and was appointed Chief Historian in 2005. Dr. Robarge has taught at George Mason University, currently teaches at Georgetown University, and also has written a biography of Chief Justice John Marshall.
The views expressed in this lecture are those of the speaker/s and do not necessarily reflect those of the George C. Marshall Foundation
