This talk was held at the Cambridge Conference on Catastrophic Risk on December 12-14 2016.
Abstract
Competing catastrophes: lessons from efforts to mitigate the risks of “dual use” research
The presentation will focus on lessons from efforts over the last 15 years to engage scientists in the development of strategies to mitigate the potential risks of continuing rapid advances in the life sciences. The primary focus has been on potential oversight mechanisms for “dual use” research. In the case of the life sciences, dual use refers to research that, although intended for beneficial purposes, has the potential to be misused for bioterrorism or for bioweapons. The premise behind such efforts is that effective policy and practice will require active commitment by scientists, who are part of many relevant sectors (academia, industry, public health and government) and that the scientific community has important roles to play. These roles include conducting education and outreach programs as well as helping to inform policymakers about developments in science and technology and their implications for security.
Discussion and debate over how “biosecurity” is best framed continue to be a key part of efforts to develop an engagement strategy. The presentation argues that the framing must:
- engage many stakeholders and fit within mandates of relevant governments and international organisations;
- facilitate reaching the widest range of scientists (e.g. in academia, industry, public health);
- be compatible with more security-focused activities for specialised, more directly affected audiences; and
- complement the existing legal and regulatory structure and provide a basis for discussing additional measures or changes in practices.
The presentation argues that the most effective framing places biosecurity within the broader context of the responsible conduct of science.
To illustrate this argument, the presentation will develop two cases. One is the activities of the InterAcademy Partnership (IAP) and its Biosecurity Working Group, in particular the relationship the Working Group has built with the Biological Weapons Convention. It will also illustrate how the current structure of the BWC has provided an important mechanism that supports the efforts of IAP and other scientific organisations to engage scientists in biosecurity issues.
The second case is the controversy that erupted in late 2011 over so-called “gain-of-function” (GOF) research and continues to incite periodic debate. The emphasis is on the role played by the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in convening public symposia to provide a mechanism for public engagement in a White House-led process to develop a policy for the effective oversight of research. The case also includes the role of the European Academies Science Advisory Council in a study it conducted at the request of the European Commission to provide recommendations for EC policy. One of the features of the GOF controversy was the division within the scientific community over the potential risks and benefits of the research.
Taken together, these cases provide the basis for discussing “our current best understanding of risks and mitigation strategies; lessons from the history of engagement with such risks; and future directions for the community engaging with their management.”
