A few days ago, the US announced some policies aimed at suppressing China's semiconductor industry. These policies include the following: for companies that receive subsidies under the "Chip Act," their investment in mainland China's 28nm or more advanced process capacity cannot exceed $100,000 within 10 years. In addition, companies that receive US subsidies cannot increase the production capacity of their 28nm or more mature process chips located in mainland China by more than 10%.

If they want to establish new factories for these types of chips, at least 85% of the production capacity must be consumed locally. Moreover, the US BIS also plans to include some subsidiaries of Chinese IT groups on its entity list to further restrict these groups' access to high-performance chips from US companies. The US has also put 19 Chinese companies on its "Unverified List," and US manufacturers must conduct more due diligence before shipping goods to these companies.

I can't remember how many rounds of sanctions the US has imposed, but its policies to restrict China's semiconductor and electronic information industry are becoming increasingly refined and targeted. In addition to local companies, the US government has also been urging semiconductor industry-developed countries and regions in Europe and East Asia to form an alliance to contain China's semiconductor industry. From last year's "Chip 4" to recent efforts to woo semiconductor equipment manufacturers in Europe and Japan to further limit exports of advanced equipment to China.

However, neither of these plans has achieved the desired results for the US. Instead, the US is struggling to digest all the consequences it has brought upon itself. So, what are the side effects of US sanctions for itself? OK, that and more is exactly what we are going to talk about.

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