This is based on Chapter 3 of Bargaining over the Bomb: [ Ссылка ]
Negotiating over nuclear weapons is commonplace. Can such deals work? If so, why do they work? This lecture investigates negotiations in a vacuum and finds that deals work even if states are complete security rivals, there is nothing to stop a country from using nuclear weapons once acquired, and the potential proliferator can take concessions and build nuclear weapons anyway. In the process, the lecture sets up the remainder of the unit. Negotiations don't always work in practice, and so the deeper research question is in understanding why failures happen despite the existence of mutually acceptable deals.
Photos of the South Korean nuclear power plant and Brazilian/Argentinian negotiations are licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0: [ Ссылка ]
Photo of Libyan negotiations is licensed under CC BY 2.0: [ Ссылка ]
