When failure rears its ugly head, tough decisions must be made. In war, that means accepting defeat or trying a new strategy. In response to insurgencies, the U.S. Military's historical reaction has been to implement counterinsurgencies using a wide array of strategies and tactics. However, the benefits of the military's use of counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts are widely debatable. Colonel Gian Gentile was the first to expose the discord amongst military strategists, analysts, and academics in their philosophies regarding COIN and its effectiveness in accomplishing the U.S.'s goals in Afghanistan in his 2008 article, "Misreading the Surge," World Politics Review. In his new book, Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency, Gentile further explores the dissent surrounding COIN doctrine. Gentile, using his personal experiences as a battalion commander in Iraq, coupled with his research into historical counterinsurgency efforts, provides a summation of his historical findings and evaluates the success of current efforts in Afghanistan. In this lecture, Gentile will be brutally honest in his assessment and will provide critical analysis of COIN policy. The lecture will also highlight his historical findings regarding COIN doctrine and how history can help with the analysis and application of current military operations.
Length: 65 Minutes
Lecture Date: January 15, 2014
